Preudhomme v. Bailey
Case No. 4D10-3262

Our firm challenged the trial court’s final judgment on behalf of a former wife claiming that the lower court erred in dividing the assets, calculating income of the husband, awarding an inadequate amount of alimony, calculating child support payable by the wife, and including overly restrictive parenting provisions. The case involved a highly contentious divorce of a sixteen year marriage involving three minor children. Although the former wife had a CPA license, she stayed at home with the minor children. The former husband traded and managed properties.

In the final judgment, the lower court commented that much of the evidence was conflicting and the facts were disputed. The court then divided the various assets and awarded sole parental responsibility with the father. In addition, the court significantly prohibited the former wife from petitioning for modification of the parenting plan unless she completed: (1) fifty-two weeks of individual psychological therapy; (2) another twenty-six weeks of joint psychological therapy with the children; (3) five additional sessions on child discipline; and (4) two eight-week sessions in parental effectiveness training.

On Appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Appellate Court determined that the lower court erred in calculating stock due to the wife based upon the lower court’s failure to make factual findings as to whether the initial stock was purchased or a gift. Furthermore, the lower court’s findings regarding numerous bonus shares of stock were not supported by competent substantial evidence.

The Court also found that the lower court erred by refusing to determine whether real property owned by the former husband in Jamaica was marital or non-marital property. Specifically, section 61.075(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, requires the court to make clear identification of marital and non-marital assets. Therefore, the lower court could not refuse to address the property in Jamaica, as it did here.

Finally, the Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in parts of the parenting plan as there was no competent substantial evidence to support the specific type and length of therapy ordered by the court for the former wife. Furthermore, there was no evidence to support the specific time restrictions on the former wife’s ability to petition for modification of the parenting plan which severely impacted her ability to parent her children. Thus, the lower court could not arbitrarily determine that the therapy must last a specific time before the former wife could request to spend more time with her children.

Judkins v. Dep’t of Revenue and Jose Briceno
Case No. 4D10-4579

We represented a mother in her appeal from the Department of Revenue’s child support order. The mother had sought an order requiring the father of her child to pay child support. Specifically, the mother’s application for child support enforcement sought financial contribution from the father for the child’s uncovered medical expenses. At the hearing, the mother introduced evidence that she paid over $10,000 in expenses due to the child’s severe asthma. The Department of Revenue order only awarded the mother $2,800 for this expense. Additionally, the hearing officer’s orally pronounced ruling stated that the mother was entitled to $26,368.00 in retroactive child support, but the written order erroneously stated that the mother was only entitled to $23,368.00.

On appeal, we argued that the Department had erred in failing to properly consider the child’s uncovered medical expenses and include those expenses in the child support calculation or order Briceno to pay them in accordance with his percentage of child support. We also argued that the written order should be amended to conform to the hearing officer’s oral pronouncement that awarded the mother $26,368.00 instead of $23,368.00. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed. The court reversed and remanded the award regarding medical expenses pursuant to section 61.30(8) Florida Statutes (2010), to provide for future uncovered expenses. The court also remanded for the lower tribunal to conform the final order to its oral pronouncement.

**[Note: At the time of this posting, the Fourth DCA mandate has not issued. The decision will not be final until disposition of a timely filed motion for rehearing.] **

Hallac v. Hallac
Case No. 4D10-4450

We represented a former wife in an appeal from the trial court’s order on opposing motions for attorney’s fees following trial. Early in the dissolution of marriage case, our client had rejected the former husband’s settlement offer and made a counteroffer. The case proceeded to trial and our client obtained a result less favorable than the former husband’s last settlement offer. Following trial, the trial court used our client’s refusal of the settlement offer as a basis to both deny our client her attorney’s fees for work after the refusal of the offer, and award the former husband his attorney’s fees incurred for the time period after our client rejected the offer. The trial court made the award despite the fact our client had virtually no income and the former husband had an annual income over $500,000 combined with substantial premarital assets.

On appeal, our firm argued that it was legal error for the trial court to use our client’s refusal of the settlement offer and the fact that she later obtained a less favorable result at trial as a basis to punish her in the attorney’s fee award. The Fourth DCA agreed in part. The Fourth DCA held that the trial court was allowed to deny our client her fees for her failure to accept the settlement offer because under Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997), a trial court is allowed to consider settlement offers and the results obtained by a party in making an award of fees under section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2009). However, the Fourth DCA found that Former Husband had no “need” to support a statutory award of fees to him, and that our client’s conduct in refusing the settlement offer did not rise to the level of vexatious or bad faith conduct sufficient to support an award against her under the court’s inherent authority to prevent such conduct.

The Fourth DCA therefore reversed the award of fees to the Former Husband. This favorable result allows our client to obtain the fees she was awarded for work prior to her rejection of the settlement offer, free of the setoff resulting from the award to the Former Husband.
** [Note: At the time of this posting, the Fourth DCA mandate has not issued. The decision will not be final until disposition of any timely filed motion for rehearing. ] **