Fourth DCA:  Trial Court Order of Juvenile Detention Pending Placement in Residential Program Did Not Violate Florida Law

V.P. v. State
Case No. 4D11-3001

The trial court adjudicated V.P. delinquent on a first-degree petit theft count, and revoked V.P.’s probation for counts of battery, second-degree petit theft, and grand theft. Pending placement in a moderate risk residential program, the trial court put V.P. on home detention with electronic monitoring and an 8 p.m. curfew. V.P. brought a petition for writ of habeus corpus, arguing the trial court’s order violated the requirement of section 985.27(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011) because “there is no statutory authority for unlimited home detention and . . . the phrase ‘must be removed from detention within 5 days’ in the first sentence [of section 985.27(1)(b)] limits all forms of detention to five days,” unless extended an additional ten days upon request of the Department of Juvenile Justice.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal stressed that the statute needed to be read in its entirety. The court reasoned that (1) home detention pending placement in a residential program was the least restrictive form of detention care available, (2) the “detention” that the statute referred to and limited to fifteen days is secure detention rather than home detention, and (3) parts of the statute would be rendered meaningless if the child had to be removed from home detention within five days. The Fourth DCA also noted that post-commitment juveniles have been found guilty of an offense and therefore no longer enjoy the presumption of innocence. The court concluded:

The legislature has structured the post-commitment detention statute in a manner that ensures that all committed juveniles awaiting placement in residential programs are physically detained or supervised in some fashion, not released without restrictions. The statute insures that those juveniles who are awaiting placement in low or moderate risk facilities do not languish in secure detention.

The court therefore denied V.P.’s petition.

Bryan v. State of Florida, 4D10-632
June 15, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeal wrote to address a trial court’s order denying a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search.  Acting on an anonymous tip, police were dispatched to investigate a call about three black males in front of a home by a white sports utility vehicle (“SUV) with narcotics and a gun.  When police arrived, only the white SUV was present that coincided with the tip.  The officers heard voices from the backyard and proceeded to enter through a gate into the appellant’s back yard.  When the officers reached the back door, they noticed marijuana inside the home through a broken window and smelled marijuana coming from the house.  After verifying that one black male was inside the home, the officers performed a protective sweep of the home, for the safety of those on the street, to see if the other male was inside the house with a weapon. The trial court upheld the warrantless entry, finding that the tip was corroborated when the white SUV was spotted and when drugs were spotted inside the home.

On appeal, the Fourth District cited Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Haire, 836 So.2d 1040, 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) that held that any area within the curtilage of the home deserves the same protection as the home itself.  The Court also noted that the possession of a gun, without more, would not justify the intrusion, and that an anonymous tip without any signs of past, present, or future criminal activity cannot give rise to a constitutional stop or search.  Relgalado v. State, 25 So.3d 600, 606-607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). In reversing the denial of the motion to suppress, the Fourth District held that no exception to the warrant requirement applied. The Court held that the officers “entered the curtilage of the home acting solely on an anonymous tip” and that there was no indication a crime had been, was being, or would be committed. Since the police entry into the backyard was illegal, the entry into the home based on the sight of the marijuana gained as a result should have been suppressed.

Barrueta v. State of Florida, 4D10-2084
June 15, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeals addressed an appeal from a revocation of probation and resulting judgment and sentence. The appellant was on probation following a conviction on one count of trafficking in cocaine and one count of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. The State later obtained revocation of appellant’s probation and the trial court sentenced appellant on both of those counts. On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant on the conspiracy count because the State’s warrant failed to allege a violation as to that count. The Fourth District agreed, relying on Baker v. State, 750 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). As a result, the Fourth District reversed the revocation, judgment, and sentence as to the conspiracy count, although it affirmed on the trafficking count. The Fourth District also remanded for entry of a more specific and detailed written judgment.

A.L.T. v. State of Florida, 4D10 – 2278
June 8, 2011

The Fourth District wrote to address whether a police search exceeded the scope of the suspect’s consent.  A.L.T., a child, was stopped by Officer Mandell of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department.  He asked A.L.T. specifically if he could “search him for weapons or drugs.” A.L.T. consented. Officer Mandell removed a wallet from A.L.T’s pocket which did not belong to A.L.T.  A records check of the address on driver’s license in the wallet revealed that a burglary occurred six days prior at that address.

A.L.T. was arrested. He waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the burglary.  The State charged A.L.T. with burglary and grand theft. The defense filed a motion to suppress and argued that the discovery of the victim’s driver’s license and A.L.T’s confession exceeded the scope of A.L.T.’s consent.  The Fourth District agreed.  “The standard for measuring the scope of a consent under the fourth amendment is objective reasonableness.  There is no bright-line test for determining the scope of consent to a warrantless search.”  Allen v. State, 909 So.2d 435, 438 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).  The Fourth District held that a typical reasonable person would have understood Officer Mandell’s request to mean “a search for weapons and drugs, not an open invitation to remove all the contents from one’s wallet.”  The Fourth District reversed the denial of A.L.T.’s motion to suppress.

D.F.J. v. State of Florida, 4D10-1763
May 25, 2011

The Fourth District addressed a juvenile defendant’s appeal of conviction for aggravated battery and robbery with a weapon. The evidence showed that the defendant and codefendant were present in the victim’s backyard, drinking beer with the victim and another man. At some point, the victim was grabbed from behind and struck. He did not witness who grabbed or struck him, although D.F.J. and the codefendant were witnessed fleeing the scene by jumping over a nearby fence. The victim could not identify who of the other three men may have committed the crime.

The defendant made a motion for judgment of dismissal, arguing that the only evidence presented against him showed that he was present at the scene and that he fled. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion. On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with the defendant that the State’s circumstantial evidence failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the defendant was present at the scene and merely a witness to the crime. The Court cited J.R. v. State, 671 So.2d 278, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) and held that a motion for judgment of dismissal should be granted in cases where all of the evidence is circumstantial and the State fails to present evidence that excludes every reasonable hypothesis except guilt: “No matter how strongly the circumstantial evidence points toward guilt, the evidence must, nonetheless, rebut any hypothesis of innocence, including that D.F.J. was present at the scene, and was merely a witness to the crime.”

The Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the charges.