The Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth DCA”) addressed a direct appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The trial court’s final judgment provided that the former wife and minor children would have exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the youngest child reached the age of eighteen or became emancipated. The former husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in including the provision for the former wife’s exclusive use and possession of the marital home where the trial court failed to provide for the termination of the former wife’s exclusive use and possession if she remarried. The Fourth DCA agreed with former husband. Citing its opinion in Arze v. Sadough-Arze, 789 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the Fourth DCA reaffirmed that awards of exclusive use and possession of the marital home should specify a time duration and provide for termination of the award on the remarriage of the spouse in residence.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) reviewed a trial court order granting a motion to vacate an eighteen year old default judgment without an evidentiary hearing. The plaintiff trustees had obtained a default judgment against Tosun in 1992. Eighteen years later, with no record activity having occurred, the trustees served Tosun with a subpoena duces tecum in aid of execution. Tosun moved to vacate the default judgment, claiming he never received service of process. Tosun alleged in his motion that the court file that would contain the return of service had since been destroyed. Tosun also attached an affidavit in which he claimed no recollection of having received the complaint and summons, or the default judgment. However, the clerk’s progress docket contained an entry indicating that Tosun had in fact been served with process. The trial court granted Tosun’s motion to vacate following a non-evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, the Fourth DCA agreed with the trustees that the trial court had erred in concluding that their failure to provide a return of service required the court to set aside the final judgment as a matter of law. The trustees had met their burden by providing the clerk’s progress docket as well as the default judgment. The court stated that “[t]ogether these documents constitute evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not service of process on Tosun was properly perfected in 1992.” The Fourth DCA reversed and remanded for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue.

We represented a former wife whose trial counsel succeeded in getting her former husband’s petition for modification of alimony dismissed, as well as attorney’s fees as a sanction. The parties had divorced in 2005 and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement whereby the former husband paid the former wife alimony. In 2009, the former husband filed a Petition for Downward Modification of Alimony. The former husband originally alleged three separate grounds as changed circumstances for his petition, but later withdrew two of them and proceeded only upon his contention that the former Wife’s receipt of social security payments constituted a sufficient change in circumstances. However, the former husband was aware that former wife’s overall financial condition had declined, even with the receipt of social security, due to a decrease in her income from her business and investments. The trial court agreed with our client’s trial counsel that the former husband failed to make a sufficient prima facie (initial) showing of a basis for modification.

The former husband appealed, arguing that he had made a prima facie case for modification, and that the trial court’s finding that the former husband’s claims were “frivolous and non-meritorious” was also in error. We responded that the trial court had not in fact granted an involuntary dismissal and that the result should be affirmed regardless. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a per curiam affirmance of the trial court decision. This ruling by the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Petition for Downward Modification, thereby maintaining the beneficial result for our client.

The parties divorced in 2006 and Former Husband was ordered to pay child support pursuant to the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement. Former Wife later remarried, and the parties agreed to a modification whereby Former Husband would pay half of the original child support amount and Former Wife’s new husband would file for formal adoption of the parties’ son, but Former Husband would have access to his son for life. An adoption proceeding was started with a new case number. However, the final order of adoption stated that Former Husband’s parental rights to his son were terminated. Former Husband later claimed in the dissolution of marriage proceeding that he did not have to pay child support since Former Wife had precluded him from seeing his son and his parental rights had been terminated by the adoption order. The family court judge ruled that she lacked further jurisdiction of the matter because the modification and adoption had closed the case.

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the family court judge still had jurisdiction despite the order of adoption. The court cited case law for the proposition that a judge in the probate, juvenile, civil or criminal division “has the authority and jurisdiction to hear cases involving child custody or dependency.” In Interest of Peterson, 364 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Additionally, the court noted that the family court had retained jurisdiction in its order on the modification agreement, whereas the trial court in the adoption had not reserved jurisdiction. The court held the family court could “determine the validity and enforceability of the [modification] agreement in light of the adoption of the child.” The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) reviewed a trial court order denying a non-party’s motion to vacate a final judgment. Robert Davis owned 40% of Aerovision, LLC, and Daniel McCue owned 60%. McCue sold his interest in Aerovision to M&M Aircraft. Davis then sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that he was the only member authorized to manage Aerovision. M&M sued Aerovision in state court seeking a similar declaration of status for McCue. The trial court, unaware of Davis’ interest in Aerovision, granted a final judgment in which it found that McCue was Aerovision’s “sole managing member.” Davis filed a motion to vacate the final judgment on the grounds of fraud, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). The trial court denied Davis’ motion because it found that the final judgment did not directly affect his rights.

On appeal, the Fourth DCA held that the facts of the case showed that the final judgment directly affected Davis’ rights such that he had standing to bring a motion to vacate the final judgment under rule 1.540(b) if the judgment was obtained by fraud or collusion, despite his status as a non-party to the state court action. The court pointed out that the parties stipulated to Davis’ 40% ownership of Aerovision and authority to manage it, as well as that the final judgment had been fraudulently obtained. The court reversed and remanded, with the instruction that the trial court could consider additional evidence.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) reviewed a trial court order approving a guardianship plan over objection from a co-trustee. The co-trustee had filed the objection exactly thirty days after the guardianship plan was filed. The trial court approved the guardianship plan despite the co-trustee’s objection. The trial court later denied the objection as untimely without addressing the merits.

On appeal, the Fourth DCA examined section 744.367(4), Florida Statutes (2010), which provides that an interested person may file an objection to a guardianship plan “within thirty days” after filing of the guardianship report. The court also reviewed section 744.369(7), Florida Statutes (2010), which provides that, “[i]f an objection has been filed to a report, the court shall set the matter for hearing and shall conduct the hearing within 30 days after the filing of the objection.” The Fourth DCA held that the plain language of the statutes entitles one who files an objection to a guardianship plan within thirty days of the filing of the guardianship plan to a hearing. The co-trustee had filed the objection timely, so the court remanded and reversed for the trial court to consider the objection.

Chase filed a foreclosure action against McLean alleging that, as the legal and/or equitable owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage, it had the right to enforce the loan because McLean defaulted under the note and mortgage. Chase asserted that it could not obtain the Promissory Note because it was lost, stolen, or destroyed. The copy of the mortgage attached to Chase’s complaint stated that American Brokers Conduit was the lender and MERS was the mortgagee. The trial court denied McLean’s motion to dismiss and ordered Chase to file a copy of the assignment in order to prove it had standing to bring the foreclosure action. Chase filed an assignment dated three days after Chase filed its foreclosure action. McLean filed a second motion to dismiss arguing that Chase did not have standing to file the foreclosure action because it was not the owner of the Note and Mortgage on the date it filed the complaint. The trial court denied McLean’s second motion to dismiss and Chase filed the original note and mortgage. The original note had a special endorsement, stating: “Pay to the Order of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Trustee Without Recourse By: American Brokers Conduit.” The endorsement to the note was not dated. Chase filed a motion for summary judgment and attached an affidavit in support of the motion. The affidavit stated that Chase “is the holder and owner” of the mortgage originally given by McLean to MERS. However, the affidavit did not specifically state when Chase became the owner of the note and mortgage, nor did the affidavit indicate that Chase was the owner of the note and mortgage before suit was filed. The trial court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of Chase and McLean appealed.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Chase. The court found that, in order for Chase to be entitled to summary judgment, it must show, without genuine issue of material fact, that it was the holder of the note on the date the complaint was filed (i.e., that the note was endorsed to Chase on or before the date the lawsuit was filed). The court noted that Chase failed to submit any record evidence proving that it had the right to enforce the note on the date the complaint was filed. Therefore, the trial court must dismiss the instant lawsuit and Chase must file a new foreclosure action.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) reviewed a trial court’s final judgment in favor of the defendant homeowners association (“HOA”) and the HOA’s board member. Heath, the plaintiff, had filed suit against the defendants for injunctive relief to compel them to enforce the terms of the HOA’s Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions. Heath alleged that the HOA did not enforce the terms of the Declaration as to certain homeowners with regards to homeowners making changes, improvements, or modifications without HOA approval.

On appeal, the Fourth DCA examined the language of the Declaration at issue, noting that the language specifically provided that “[t]he Developer, the Association, or any individual may, but shall not be required to, seek enforcement of the Declaration.” The Fourth DCA concluded that the language meant that enforcement of the Declaration by the HOA was purely in the HOA’s discretion, so that Heath did not have a clear legal right to an injunction to compel enforcement. Murtagh v. Hurley, 40 So. 3d 62, 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). The Fourth DCA pointed out that the trial court had found in favor of the defendants for a different reason, but had still reached the correct result.

JCPenney sued Dillard’s for damage to its store at the Turtle Creek Mall in Mississippi. In 2005, the roof over the Dillard’s store (which was adjacent to the JCP store) collapsed from Hurricane Katrina, severing a sprinkler main and causing uncontrolled water flow into the mall and the JCP store. Dillard’s moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that pursuant to the Turtle Creek Mall Operating Agreement (OA), JCP and Dillard’s agreed to release each other from liability from any loss or damage to property covered by the party’s insurance policy. However, they expressly reserved the right to bring an action for any “deductible” amount contained in their insurance policies. Dillard’s also filed a second motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that JCP could not recover any damages because JCP had already recovered from its insurer the entire damage amount claimed without any deductible being applied. In opposition, JCP argued that the notion that it had been made whole for its Turtle Creek Mall losses was illusory because JCP’s insurer treated Hurricane Katrina-related losses at several covered JCP stores as one “occurrence” for coverage purposes and unilaterally elected to apply the policy’s entire $2.5 million-per-event deductible to one JCP store (the Biloxi, Mississippi store). JCP argued that it had not been made whole for its losses in the Turtle Creek Mall. The trial court granted both partial motions for summary judgment.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with JCP’s argument that the trial court erred in limiting its recovery to the deductible because under Mississippi law, Dillard’s cannot contractually exculpate itself against breaches of duties imposed by common law and for torts involving gross negligence. Instead, the court noted the parties were sophisticated national retailers, occupying equal bargaining positions, in negotiations for a commercial operating agreement and that the exculpatory clause was valid and did not contravene public policy. The court also found that Dillard’s conduct did not rise to the level of gross negligence simply because a different Dillard’s roof, in a different store, sustained damage in a prior hurricane, and Dillard’s internal memoranda acknowledged the potential for damage due to hurricanes and the need to perform maintenance prior to such storms. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s summary judgment order and held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to how the deductible was apportioned and whether the application of the deductible was beyond JCP’s control.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) reviewed a trial court order granting summary judgment of foreclosure against the homeowners, who were husband and wife. At the time HSBC filed its complaint in the trial court, it attached a mortgage showing the Dukes as the borrowers and a company called First NLC Financial as the lender. HSBC alleged in the complaint that it owned the Dukes’ note and mortgage pursuant to an assignment. However, HSBC failed to attach the assignment to its complaint. HSBC later filed a notice of assignment and attached a copy of the assignment that was executed after HSBC filed the complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment for HSBC.

On appeal, the Fourth DCA held that the discrepancy between the attached mortgage showing First NLC Financial as the lender and HSBC’s allegation in the complaint that it owned the note and mortgage created a genuine issue of material fact regarding ownership of the note and mortgage that precluded summary judgment. Citing BAC Funding Consortium, Inc. v. Jean-Jacques, 28 So. 3d 936, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), the Fourth DCA noted that exhibits control over allegations in a complaint, and therefore the at the time of filing the complaint, the attached mortgage listing First NLC Financial as the lender controlled over HSBC’s allegation in the complaint that it owned the note and mortgage pursuant to an assignment. The court reversed the order granting summary judgment.