The issue was whether a trial court’s order denying exceptions to a general magistrate’s report and affirming the report, with several exceptions, was appealable as a final order or an appealable non-final order.

We represented the Father of an infant child in a contentious custody dispute over timesharing and other issues. A general magistrate entered a report with recommendations regarding a time-sharing schedule, child support, and daycare for the child.  The general magistrate also found that the Father had been involuntarily absent from the child’s life due to the Mother’s actions and her failure to facilitate a relationship between the Father and child.  The trial court judge affirmed and implemented the magistrate’s report with several exceptions, and the Mother appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

We filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing (1) that the trial court’s order was neither a final order nor an appealable non-final order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii), and (2) that the appeal should be dismissed based on the Mother’s failure to file an Initial Brief within the time frame required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(e).  The court of appeals granted our motion, and we succeeded in obtaining dismissal of the Mother’s appeal for our client.

The issue was whether our client was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, under the settlement agreement between the parties and as a prevailing party, after the opposing party failed to honor certain provisions in their settlement agreement.

After years of litigating a probate matter, our client and the opposing party entered into a settlement agreement. A provision in the settlement agreement stated that the opposing party would provide, within 45 days, possession and access to medical records that were necessary for the treatment and diagnosis of our client’s medical conditions, or pay for the reasonable cost incurred from compelling performance. When the opposing party failed to provide possession and access to the records, our client filed a motion to compel compliance and requested an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. The trial court granted our client’s motion, but held that the breach of the settlement was not material and denied our client’s request for attorney’s fees. The opposing party appealed the trial court’s order arguing for an award of attorney’s fees because our client failed to prove that the breach was material. Our client cross-appealed arguing for attorney’s fees as the true prevailing party.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal performed a de novo review of the matter and held that the trial court did not err in denying the opposing party’s request for attorney’s fees, but the trial court did err in failing to award our client the reasonable attorney’s fees requested and also erred in determining that the opposing party’s breach, as a whole, was not material. Thus, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees to the opposing party, but reversed and remanded the denial of attorney’s fees to our client with directions to award our client reasonable attorney’s fees under the settlement agreement and as a prevailing party.

Editor’s Note: At the time of writing this blog entry, a mandate from the court had not been issued.

The issue as to whether or not an insurance company can deny coverage to an innocent co-insured based on the failure of a spouse to attend an examination under oath (EUO) was resolved in favor of our client, the innocent co-insured.

Our client’s home was burglarized by an unknown assailant. The client preformed all conditions precedent to coverage. The insurance company required that the husband, who lived at home at the time of the burglary and was the person who discovered the home burglarized, sit for an EUO. The problem was that by the time the EUO was scheduled, the husband was no longer living at home; and in fact a restraining order for domestic violence had been issued against him. Counsel for the client argued the innocent co-insured exception at the trial level, and we reasserted it at the appellate level.

The Circuit Court sitting in its appellate capacity overturned the trial courts summary judgment. Further, the reviewing court held that where an insurance policy does not expressly state whether the obligation to attend an EUO is joint or several, the ambiguity should be resolved as requiring the obligations and coverage to apply severally. The summary judgment finding that the failure of the husband to submit to an EUO was a material breach which barred the insured from recovering under the policy was reversed and remanded.  Our client was awarded appellate attorney fees pursuant to Florida Statute 627.428(1).

The law of the case doctrine states generally that questions of law that actually have been decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court and in the trial court through all subsequent states of the proceedings. State Dept. of Revenue v. Bridger, 935 So. 2d 536, 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). We were recently successful affirming a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to compel arbitration.  In this case, a luxury automotive dealership in Kendal had originally filed a motion to compel arbitration under the arbitration provision of a contract that was signed by the consumer. The trial court entered a favorable order and the parties proceeded to arbitration. At arbitration, however, the car dealership argued that the contract was in fact not executed, and therefore that the consumer was not entitled to relief under a contract that was not executed.  In essence, the car dealership argued that there was no contract. The dealership was successful in obtaining an arbitration award in its favor.

On appeal, the consumer was successful in having the Third District Court of Appeal reverse the trial court’s order, which had confirmed the original arbitration award.  The Third District held that that if there is no contract, there can be no arbitration clause of a non-existent contract. Niven v. G.F.B. Enterprises, LLC, 849 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), citing, Henderson v. Coral Springs Nissan, Inc., 757 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Thus, the law of the case was established.

Nevertheless, the dealership, after subsequent litigation, again moved for a renewed motion to compel arbitration, citing that an exception to the law of the case doctrine existed. The trial court denied said motion, and the dealership appealed. We were successful in arguing to the Third District, however, that under the facts of this case, there were no grounds sufficient to support the application of any exception and that the law of the case had been established. The Court agreed with our position and affirmed.

While there are specific mandates under Florida law that require the Florida Supreme Court to grant review in certain instances, for most practitioners, getting your case heard by the Florida Supreme Court can seem as daunting as getting a front seat at the Kodak Theater during the Oscars.  Alas, Robin I. Bresky and Diana L. Martin have offered a practical guide for those practitioners seeking entry into the highest court in the state.  Robin Bresky co-authored Taking the Pathway of Discretionary Review Toward Florida’s Highest Court, which was featured in the November 2009 issue of the Florida Bar Journal.  The article is intended to help practitioners navigate the Florida Supreme Court’s red carpet and assess the likelihood of gaining access behind its discretionary velvet ropes.

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.120 sets out the procedural mandates necessary to invoke the Florida Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  The more challenging task, however, becomes convincing the Court to exercise its jurisdiction.  For example, Florida Supreme Court Clerk statistics indicate that of the cases submitted to the high court for consideration, only 7% of cases seeking discretionary review, which do not involve cases of certified questions or certified conflicts, are granted review.  On the other hand, the Court grants review in approximately 67% of cases that involve certified questions and approximately 83% of certified conflict cases.  See, Florida Appellate Practice § 3.21.  Therefore, in cases where the district court has not certified a question or certified a conflict, the true hurdle remains convincing the Court to accept discretionary jurisdiction.

In addition to outlining the relevant constitutional provisions and appellate rules, the article discusses eight categories of discretionary review and provides practical guidance, including outlining timeframes for attorneys considering an appeal to Florida’s Highest Court.  As highlighted above, the article cites useful statistics that illustrate the types of cases that make it through and those that do not fare as well.  It proves helpful not only to appellate practitioners, but more so to any attorney that has found himself in the position of advising a client on a decision to seek review in Florida’s Highest Court.  Afterall, it will take more than a “Best Dressed” nod from Joan Rivers to get you through these velvet ropes.  For more on Taking the Pathway of Discretionary Review Toward Florida’s Highest Court, please visit www.breskyappellate.com for the complete article or refer to the November 2009 issue of the Florida Bar Journal.

Many of us are taught at a young age to trust the men and women of the cloth; cloth in this case consisting of a white poly-cotton blend lab coat.  In most cases, we trust our physicians with our lives and the lives of our loved ones.  As patients, we listen and do as directed by our doctors because afterall, they do know best.  In the context of medical malpractice, however, this doctor/patient relationship can become tenuous when the patient feels the doctor’s care has dropped below the acceptable standard and resulted in injury.   Trusting patients who feel they have been injured at the hands of a physician quickly turn into inquisitive clients in search of justice.  Our firm recently received a favorable Opinion from the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the context of a medical malpractice action.  Specifically, the decision hinged on the statute of limitations in the medical malpractice arena and when the time for said cause of action begins to accrue.

Florida Statue 95.11(4)(b) governs the limitations period for a medical malpractice action.  The section states that an action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence . . . .”  In Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court articulated the standard to be applied as follows:  “the knowledge of the injury as referred to in the rule as triggering the statute of limitations means not only knowledge of the injury but also that there is a reasonable possibility that the injury was cause by medical malpractice.”  Certainly there are injuries that clearly are caused by medical malpractice.  For example, going into surgery to have a cyst removed from your hand and waking to find yourare missing your left leg.  But what happens when you experience a less conspicuous injury and although your body is telling you one thing, the physician whose continuing care you are under is reassuring you that all is well and that in time, things will be better?  This is the precise issue involved in our case.  Essentially there was a factual dispute as to when the patient knew or should have been aware that her injuries may have been the result of medical malpractice.  And, instead of submitting that question to the jury for determination, the judge decided at summary judgment that the statute of limitations had run.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the judge’s decision in our favor and found that the judge had erred in taking that question from the jury.  The Court, recognizing the inherent trust placed upon a physician by a patient, stated “too great is the faith laypersons place in their physicians for the law to impute a duty on them to investigate malpractice in every change in diagnosis or treatment.”  (quoting from Cunningham v. Lowery, 724 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  Thus, it appears the courts have tried to impose a balance between patient accountability and the importance of preserving a trusting doctor/patient relationship during and throughout treatment.  Most important, however, is that the question will often hinge upon a factual determination and will more often than not be left to the province of the jury to decide.

Attorney-client privilege is the right of clients to refuse to disclose confidential communications with their lawyers to third parties. This privilege is fundamental to preserve the right to effective legal counsel. Lawyers cannot function effectively on behalf of their clients without the ability to communicate with them in confidence.

With that said, as an appellate attorney, I was successful in overturning a trial court’s decision denying a protective order—preventing the disclosure of attorney client communication.[1] In a case, where a son was suing his mother, we filed a Writ of Certiorari on a discovery issue—a litigation process during which each party requests relevant information and documents from the other side in an attempt to “discover” pertinent facts. The information the son was seeking from the mother, I believed to be attorney-client privilege.

By filing for a Writ of Certiorari, often referred to as a Writ of Cert, I swiftly completed a petition explaining to the appellate court the reasoning that the trial court’s interlocutory order needed to be reversed. After evaluating the petition the appellate court decides whether or not to grant a show cause order to the opposing party. If the court issues a show cause order the opposing party answers the petition. In this particular case the court issued a show cause order and the reply was submitted by the opposing parties’ council.

In less than two months the appellate agreed with our position and the Writ of Cert I filed was granted; and the trial courts decision denying the protective order was overturned. Had we not petitioned the appellate court with the Writ of Cert, the opposing party would have access to privileged information. Thus, I was able to prevent letting the proverbial cat out of the bag.

Robin Bresky, Law Offices of Robin Bresky

[1] A large part of my practice is drafting pre-trial litigation as well as appellate briefs. Please note, in the case stated above, I was hired as a ghostwriter for another attorney who sought my services, because of my extensive knowledge on appellate law. In addition to my own clients, I offer litigation support to other attorneys that seek my expertise.