Michele K. Feinzig, along with Plaintiff’s trial counsel, Scott Sheftall of Sheftall & Torres, P.A., represented the Plaintiff/Appellant in an appeal of a defense final judgment following a zero verdict in a negligent security case (Third DCA Case No. 3D10-975). The Plaintiff was robbed and then raped at gunpoint while working the graveyard shift as a retail cash clerk early Christmas morning. She brought a negligent security action against the store due to its failure to provide adequate security despite a history of previous violent crimes, both on the premises and in the vicinity. During the trial, the Defendant store admitted that the Plaintiff was not negligent and in no way contributed to her being robbed and raped. Also, the Defendant store’s expert testified that had he been advising the store before the attack on the Plaintiff, he would have recommended that the store add an unarmed security guard to its security measures. The defense expert admitted that if such an unarmed security guard had been in place, the Plaintiff more than likely would not have been raped. Despite this and other compelling evidence supporting the Plaintiff’s case against the store, the jury came back with a zero verdict because it was allowed to hear improper, prejudicial testimony from the defense’s expert that this was a “victim-targeted crime” which could neither be foreseen nor prevented by any reasonable security measures. 

In February 2012, the Third DCA reversed for a new trial, finding that the store’s expert’s testimony that this was an unforeseeable, unpreventable “victim-targeted crime” was beyond the scope of his expertise, and should not have been admitted. The store moved for rehearing and rehearing en banc, and in November 2012, the Third DCA denied both motions. All of the appellate judges at the Third DCA, including those on the original panel, joined in the denial of rehearing en banc. With respect to rehearing, one Judge who was on the original panel change her mind and wrote a dissent, stating that she would grant rehearing and affirm the jury’s zero verdict. Nonetheless, the majority’s reversal and denial of rehearing, along with the entire Court’s denial of rehearing en banc, ensured Plaintiff’s entitlement to a new trial at which she could seek fair compensation for the damages she has suffered due to the store’s negligence, without being tainted by the store’s expert’s “victim-targeted crime” theory. The parties have since reached a confidential settlement.

Cissel v. Cissel, 4D09-3029 & 4D10-1324
June 22, 2011

The Fourth District wrote to address an appeal of an alimony award and child support.  The court below found the former husband, appellant, to have a gross monthly income of $18,109.  The figure was based on his average earnings during the preceding fourteen months of trial.  The appellant argued that this error.  The Fourth District held that although it was acceptable to use this average, it was error to base any support from this figure in this case.  Citing §61.08(2)(i), Fla. Stat. (requiring consideration of all sources of income available to either party), the Fourth District found the trial court to have failed to deduct the husband’s undisputed business expenses.
The Fourth District also found error in the trial court’s award of alimony to former wife.  The trial court had only made findings as to the length of the marriage and the $20,000 per month standard of living that exceeded the parties’ incomes.  On appeal, the Fourth District again referred to §61.08(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring findings of facts relative to the factors enumerated in subsection (2) supporting an award of alimony).  Additionally, the court noted that the marital standard of living is not a useful guide in awarding alimony where the marital lifestyle costs more than the parties’ earnings.  Nichols v. Nichols, 907 So.2d 620, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  The Fourth District reversed and remanded.

Curtis v. City of West Palm Beach, 4D10-876
June 22, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether a firefighter could claim monetary damages under the Firefighter’s Bill of Rights (“FBR”). The firefighter sought monetary relief for alleged violations of the FBR by the City of West Palm Beach in imposing disciplinary action against him. The City obtained summary judgment because the trial court concluded monetary damages were unavailable under the FBR.
On appeal, the Fourth DCA affirmed, holding that the FBR permitted only injunctive relief. The Court noted that the remedies available for a statutory violation are to be determined by the clear and unambiguous language of that statute.  The Fourth DCA held that the FBR’s language clearly permits injunctive relief as the sole remedy for a violation of its terms.  The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that section 112.84, Florida Statutes (2007) permitted monetary relief for a violation of the FBR as a “right and privilege guaranteed to all citizens.”  While section 112.84 states that “[t]hese rights include the right to bring suit against any…organization… for damages, either monetary or otherwise, suffered during the performance of the firefighter’s official duties or for abridgment of the firefighter’s rights…,” the Court held that the language of section 112.84 refers only to other rights or remedies available under the statute in question.  The Court looked to the legislative intent behind the statute and found that the legislature intended injunctive relief to be the sole remedy for a violation of the FBR.

Bryan v. State of Florida, 4D10-632
June 15, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeal wrote to address a trial court’s order denying a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search.  Acting on an anonymous tip, police were dispatched to investigate a call about three black males in front of a home by a white sports utility vehicle (“SUV) with narcotics and a gun.  When police arrived, only the white SUV was present that coincided with the tip.  The officers heard voices from the backyard and proceeded to enter through a gate into the appellant’s back yard.  When the officers reached the back door, they noticed marijuana inside the home through a broken window and smelled marijuana coming from the house.  After verifying that one black male was inside the home, the officers performed a protective sweep of the home, for the safety of those on the street, to see if the other male was inside the house with a weapon. The trial court upheld the warrantless entry, finding that the tip was corroborated when the white SUV was spotted and when drugs were spotted inside the home.

On appeal, the Fourth District cited Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Haire, 836 So.2d 1040, 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) that held that any area within the curtilage of the home deserves the same protection as the home itself.  The Court also noted that the possession of a gun, without more, would not justify the intrusion, and that an anonymous tip without any signs of past, present, or future criminal activity cannot give rise to a constitutional stop or search.  Relgalado v. State, 25 So.3d 600, 606-607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). In reversing the denial of the motion to suppress, the Fourth District held that no exception to the warrant requirement applied. The Court held that the officers “entered the curtilage of the home acting solely on an anonymous tip” and that there was no indication a crime had been, was being, or would be committed. Since the police entry into the backyard was illegal, the entry into the home based on the sight of the marijuana gained as a result should have been suppressed.

Barrueta v. State of Florida, 4D10-2084
June 15, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeals addressed an appeal from a revocation of probation and resulting judgment and sentence. The appellant was on probation following a conviction on one count of trafficking in cocaine and one count of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. The State later obtained revocation of appellant’s probation and the trial court sentenced appellant on both of those counts. On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant on the conspiracy count because the State’s warrant failed to allege a violation as to that count. The Fourth District agreed, relying on Baker v. State, 750 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). As a result, the Fourth District reversed the revocation, judgment, and sentence as to the conspiracy count, although it affirmed on the trafficking count. The Fourth District also remanded for entry of a more specific and detailed written judgment.

Konz v. Konz, 4D09-4454
June 1, 2011

The Fourth District addressed an issue of valuation regarding a marital residence during a dissolution of marriage proceeding.  At the time of the marriage, appellant, husband owned a home that had a fair market value of $380,000 with a $25,000 mortgage.  During the marriage, the home was demolished and the mortgage was paid off.  The parties built a new home on the same lot, with a fair market value of $520,000.  In the equitable distribution, the trial court treated the entire home as a marital asset and equally divided the equity.

On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court failed to award him a portion of the value of the home as a nonmarital asset. The Fourth District disagreed, holding that the former husband failed to meet his burden to establish the value of the nonmarital portion of the marital home.  See Jahnke v. Jahnke, 804 So.2d 513, 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).  There was no evidence of the value of the lot by itself, which would have qualified as the nonmarital portion of the value of the marital home, when the original house was torn down.  The Fourth District noted that the failure to prove the nonmarital value of the lot distinguished the case from Oldham v. Oldham, 683 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The Fourth District affirmed the equal equity distribution of the marital residence.