Law Offices of Robin Bresky Obtains Affirmance of Order Limiting Successor Mortgagee’s Liability Following a Foreclosure Sale

The Sterling Villages of Palm Beach Lakes v. The Bank of New York, 4D11-3008

The Law Offices of Robin Bresky recently won an affirmance of an order limiting a successor mortgagee’s liability to the homeowner’s association (“HOA”) following a foreclosure sale. Our client held a mortgage on property located within the HOA. The unit owner defaulted. Our client foreclosed on the property, and joined the HOA in the foreclosure suit. Our client purchased the unit at foreclosure sale and obtained a certificate of title.

Following the foreclosure sale, our client sought to determine its liability to the HOA for the outstanding unpaid assessments on the unit. Our client took the position that it was a successor mortgagee whose liability for unpaid assessments was limited by the operation of section 718.116(1)(b), Florida Statutes, to the lesser of the preceding twelve months’ assessments prior to taking title, or one percent of the mortgage debt. The HOA sought discovery on the issue of whether our client was a successor mortgagee. The HOA also argued that our client was required to initiate a separate proceeding in which to determine the amounts due to the HOA. The HOA also sought various amounts for interest and other charges accruing prior to the time our client took title. The trial court rendered an order in our client’s favor denying discovery and limiting our client’s liability pursuant to the statute. The HOA appealed.

We argued on appeal that the trial court had already determined in its Final Judgment of Foreclosure that our client was a successor mortgagee and the HOA had failed to appeal the Final Judgment, so discovery on that issue would not be appropriate. We also argued that our client’s liability was limited by the statute and the statute did not include the various additional amounts sought by the HOA. The Fourth DCA issued a per curiam affirmance of the trial court’s order. This result in the appellate court preserved the beneficial outcome for our client.

Hallac v. Hallac
Case No. 4D10-4450

We represented a former wife in an appeal from the trial court’s order on opposing motions for attorney’s fees following trial. On appeal, our firm argued that it was legal error for the trial court to have used our client’s refusal of a settlement offer and the fact that she later obtained a less favorable result at trial as a basis to punish her in the attorney’s fee award.

The Fourth DCA agreed in part. The Fourth DCA held that the trial court was allowed to deny our client her fees for her failure to accept the settlement offer because under Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997), a trial court is allowed to consider settlement offers and the results obtained by a party in making an award of fees under section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2009). However, the Fourth DCA found that the former husband had no “need” to support a statutory award of fees to him, and that our client’s conduct in refusing the settlement offer did not rise to the level of vexatious or bad faith conduct sufficient to support an award against her under the court’s inherent authority to prevent such conduct.

The Fourth DCA reversed the award of fees to the former husband. This favorable result would allow our client to obtain the fees she was awarded for work prior to her rejection of the settlement offer, free of the setoff resulting from the award to the former husband. However, the former husband then filed a motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and certification of conflict. The former husband asked the Fourth DCA to revisit its decision on the grounds that the decision conflicted with decisions from the Florida Supreme Court and other Florida district courts of appeal.

We opposed the former husband’s motions. We argued that the Fourth DCA’s decision in this case did not conflict with any of its previous decisions. Furthermore, while we acknowledged some general conflict between the Fourth DCA’s decision in this case and decisions from other district courts of appeal, we argued that the conflict would not change the result in this case due to the Fourth DCA’s holding that our client’s conduct did not amount to bad faith or vexatious litigation. On June 5, 2012, the Fourth DCA denied the former husband’s motions, and we successfully preserved our client’s appellate win in the Fourth DCA.

Judkins v. Dep’t of Revenue and Jose Briceno
Case No. 4D10-4579

We represented a mother in her appeal from the Department of Revenue’s child support order. The mother had sought an order requiring the father of her child to pay child support. Specifically, the mother’s application for child support enforcement sought financial contribution from the father for the child’s uncovered medical expenses. At the hearing, the mother introduced evidence that she paid over $10,000 in expenses due to the child’s severe asthma. The Department of Revenue order only awarded the mother $2,800 for this expense. Additionally, the hearing officer’s orally pronounced ruling stated that the mother was entitled to $26,368.00 in retroactive child support, but the written order erroneously stated that the mother was only entitled to $23,368.00.

On appeal, we argued that the Department had erred in failing to properly consider the child’s uncovered medical expenses and include those expenses in the child support calculation or order Briceno to pay them in accordance with his percentage of child support. We also argued that the written order should be amended to conform to the hearing officer’s oral pronouncement that awarded the mother $26,368.00 instead of $23,368.00. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed. The court reversed and remanded the award regarding medical expenses pursuant to section 61.30(8) Florida Statutes (2010), to provide for future uncovered expenses. The court also remanded for the lower tribunal to conform the final order to its oral pronouncement.

**[Note: At the time of this posting, the Fourth DCA mandate has not issued. The decision will not be final until disposition of a timely filed motion for rehearing.] **

Hallac v. Hallac
Case No. 4D10-4450

We represented a former wife in an appeal from the trial court’s order on opposing motions for attorney’s fees following trial. Early in the dissolution of marriage case, our client had rejected the former husband’s settlement offer and made a counteroffer. The case proceeded to trial and our client obtained a result less favorable than the former husband’s last settlement offer. Following trial, the trial court used our client’s refusal of the settlement offer as a basis to both deny our client her attorney’s fees for work after the refusal of the offer, and award the former husband his attorney’s fees incurred for the time period after our client rejected the offer. The trial court made the award despite the fact our client had virtually no income and the former husband had an annual income over $500,000 combined with substantial premarital assets.

On appeal, our firm argued that it was legal error for the trial court to use our client’s refusal of the settlement offer and the fact that she later obtained a less favorable result at trial as a basis to punish her in the attorney’s fee award. The Fourth DCA agreed in part. The Fourth DCA held that the trial court was allowed to deny our client her fees for her failure to accept the settlement offer because under Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997), a trial court is allowed to consider settlement offers and the results obtained by a party in making an award of fees under section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2009). However, the Fourth DCA found that Former Husband had no “need” to support a statutory award of fees to him, and that our client’s conduct in refusing the settlement offer did not rise to the level of vexatious or bad faith conduct sufficient to support an award against her under the court’s inherent authority to prevent such conduct.

The Fourth DCA therefore reversed the award of fees to the Former Husband. This favorable result allows our client to obtain the fees she was awarded for work prior to her rejection of the settlement offer, free of the setoff resulting from the award to the Former Husband.
** [Note: At the time of this posting, the Fourth DCA mandate has not issued. The decision will not be final until disposition of any timely filed motion for rehearing. ] **

Fourth DCA:  Trial Court Order of Juvenile Detention Pending Placement in Residential Program Did Not Violate Florida Law

V.P. v. State
Case No. 4D11-3001

The trial court adjudicated V.P. delinquent on a first-degree petit theft count, and revoked V.P.’s probation for counts of battery, second-degree petit theft, and grand theft. Pending placement in a moderate risk residential program, the trial court put V.P. on home detention with electronic monitoring and an 8 p.m. curfew. V.P. brought a petition for writ of habeus corpus, arguing the trial court’s order violated the requirement of section 985.27(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011) because “there is no statutory authority for unlimited home detention and . . . the phrase ‘must be removed from detention within 5 days’ in the first sentence [of section 985.27(1)(b)] limits all forms of detention to five days,” unless extended an additional ten days upon request of the Department of Juvenile Justice.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal stressed that the statute needed to be read in its entirety. The court reasoned that (1) home detention pending placement in a residential program was the least restrictive form of detention care available, (2) the “detention” that the statute referred to and limited to fifteen days is secure detention rather than home detention, and (3) parts of the statute would be rendered meaningless if the child had to be removed from home detention within five days. The Fourth DCA also noted that post-commitment juveniles have been found guilty of an offense and therefore no longer enjoy the presumption of innocence. The court concluded:

The legislature has structured the post-commitment detention statute in a manner that ensures that all committed juveniles awaiting placement in residential programs are physically detained or supervised in some fashion, not released without restrictions. The statute insures that those juveniles who are awaiting placement in low or moderate risk facilities do not languish in secure detention.

The court therefore denied V.P.’s petition.

Curtis v. City of West Palm Beach, 4D10-876
June 22, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether a firefighter could claim monetary damages under the Firefighter’s Bill of Rights (“FBR”). The firefighter sought monetary relief for alleged violations of the FBR by the City of West Palm Beach in imposing disciplinary action against him. The City obtained summary judgment because the trial court concluded monetary damages were unavailable under the FBR.
On appeal, the Fourth DCA affirmed, holding that the FBR permitted only injunctive relief. The Court noted that the remedies available for a statutory violation are to be determined by the clear and unambiguous language of that statute.  The Fourth DCA held that the FBR’s language clearly permits injunctive relief as the sole remedy for a violation of its terms.  The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that section 112.84, Florida Statutes (2007) permitted monetary relief for a violation of the FBR as a “right and privilege guaranteed to all citizens.”  While section 112.84 states that “[t]hese rights include the right to bring suit against any…organization… for damages, either monetary or otherwise, suffered during the performance of the firefighter’s official duties or for abridgment of the firefighter’s rights…,” the Court held that the language of section 112.84 refers only to other rights or remedies available under the statute in question.  The Court looked to the legislative intent behind the statute and found that the legislature intended injunctive relief to be the sole remedy for a violation of the FBR.