The issue of whether the trial court erred in denying our client’s motion for attorney’s fees based on a charging lien merely because our client did not call an independent expert witness to testify concerning the reasonableness of the fees has been certified to the Florida Supreme Court.

Our client, an attorney, represented the Former Wife in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Our client and the Former Wife entered into a retainer agreement which provided for an initial non-refundable retainer, an hourly rate for attorney and paralegal time, and a lien for monies due under the agreement. The agreement also required the Former Wife to notify our client, in writing, within thirty days, if there was an objection to the fees charged. The Former Wife paid $48,268 of the total billed, leaving a balance of $57,785.28. The Former Wife did not object in writing to the fees charged. In the dissolution action, our client filed a Notice of Charging Lien, a Corrected Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Adjudicating Charging Lien and for Entry of a Money Judgment, and a Motion to Withdraw. The trial court granted the Motion to Withdraw, held a final hearing of the dissolution, and heard our client’s attorney’s fees motion. Although the trial court received into evidence the retainer agreement, the complete billing history, and the Notice of Charging Lien, the trial court denied our client’s motion citing to the missing testimony from an independent expert witness concerning the reasonableness of the fees.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reluctantly affirmed the trial court’s decision, but certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court as to whether independent expert testimony was necessary. The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that “[t]here is little reason to simply increase litigation costs by requiring another lawyer to testify as an expert. After all, each party usually chooses a lawyer friend . . . [, and] [t]he trial court is ultimately left to decide the reasonableness of the rate charged and time expended, and then to tax the cost of the expert witness against the losing party.”

The issue was whether our client was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, under the settlement agreement between the parties and as a prevailing party, after the opposing party failed to honor certain provisions in their settlement agreement.

After years of litigating a probate matter, our client and the opposing party entered into a settlement agreement. A provision in the settlement agreement stated that the opposing party would provide, within 45 days, possession and access to medical records that were necessary for the treatment and diagnosis of our client’s medical conditions, or pay for the reasonable cost incurred from compelling performance. When the opposing party failed to provide possession and access to the records, our client filed a motion to compel compliance and requested an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. The trial court granted our client’s motion, but held that the breach of the settlement was not material and denied our client’s request for attorney’s fees. The opposing party appealed the trial court’s order arguing for an award of attorney’s fees because our client failed to prove that the breach was material. Our client cross-appealed arguing for attorney’s fees as the true prevailing party.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal performed a de novo review of the matter and held that the trial court did not err in denying the opposing party’s request for attorney’s fees, but the trial court did err in failing to award our client the reasonable attorney’s fees requested and also erred in determining that the opposing party’s breach, as a whole, was not material. Thus, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees to the opposing party, but reversed and remanded the denial of attorney’s fees to our client with directions to award our client reasonable attorney’s fees under the settlement agreement and as a prevailing party.

Editor’s Note: At the time of writing this blog entry, a mandate from the court had not been issued.

Many of us are taught at a young age to trust the men and women of the cloth; cloth in this case consisting of a white poly-cotton blend lab coat.  In most cases, we trust our physicians with our lives and the lives of our loved ones.  As patients, we listen and do as directed by our doctors because afterall, they do know best.  In the context of medical malpractice, however, this doctor/patient relationship can become tenuous when the patient feels the doctor’s care has dropped below the acceptable standard and resulted in injury.   Trusting patients who feel they have been injured at the hands of a physician quickly turn into inquisitive clients in search of justice.  Our firm recently received a favorable Opinion from the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the context of a medical malpractice action.  Specifically, the decision hinged on the statute of limitations in the medical malpractice arena and when the time for said cause of action begins to accrue.

Florida Statue 95.11(4)(b) governs the limitations period for a medical malpractice action.  The section states that an action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence . . . .”  In Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court articulated the standard to be applied as follows:  “the knowledge of the injury as referred to in the rule as triggering the statute of limitations means not only knowledge of the injury but also that there is a reasonable possibility that the injury was cause by medical malpractice.”  Certainly there are injuries that clearly are caused by medical malpractice.  For example, going into surgery to have a cyst removed from your hand and waking to find yourare missing your left leg.  But what happens when you experience a less conspicuous injury and although your body is telling you one thing, the physician whose continuing care you are under is reassuring you that all is well and that in time, things will be better?  This is the precise issue involved in our case.  Essentially there was a factual dispute as to when the patient knew or should have been aware that her injuries may have been the result of medical malpractice.  And, instead of submitting that question to the jury for determination, the judge decided at summary judgment that the statute of limitations had run.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the judge’s decision in our favor and found that the judge had erred in taking that question from the jury.  The Court, recognizing the inherent trust placed upon a physician by a patient, stated “too great is the faith laypersons place in their physicians for the law to impute a duty on them to investigate malpractice in every change in diagnosis or treatment.”  (quoting from Cunningham v. Lowery, 724 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  Thus, it appears the courts have tried to impose a balance between patient accountability and the importance of preserving a trusting doctor/patient relationship during and throughout treatment.  Most important, however, is that the question will often hinge upon a factual determination and will more often than not be left to the province of the jury to decide.