Law Offices of Robin Bresky Obtains Affirmance of Final Judgment Based on Verdict for Plaintiff in Personal Injury Automobile Accident Suit

Garcia Rojas v. Aristizabal, 3D12-384

The Law Offices of Robin Bresky recently won an affirmance of a final judgment awarding our client damages for personal injuries he sustained in an automobile accident. Our client went to trial in his personal injury suit and obtained a jury award of $185,277 in the trial court in Miami. No medical expert testified at the trial, but our client testified about his injuries, his treatment, and the resulting medical bills. The trial court admitted the medical bills into evidence over defense counsel’s objection. The trial court later entered a final judgment in our client’s favor based upon the jury verdict.

The defendant appealed the final judgment, arguing that our client had not provided sufficient testimony to admit the medical bills into evidence. We argued that our client’s testimony was sufficient under Florida law to make the reasonableness and necessity of medical bills a question for the jury. We stressed that Florida law does not require expert medical testimony in order to prove the reasonableness of a personal injury plaintiff’s medical bills.

The Third DCA issued a per curiam affirmance of the trial court’s order. This result in the appellate court preserved our client’s hard-won jury verdict.
** The mandate has not yet issued **

Bell v. Bell,
Case No. 4D10-5122

This was a divorce case with several contested issues regarding the parties’ assets. Our client, the former wife, appealed the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The former husband cross-appealed. Our client’s main issues were (1) the trial court’s failure to award her half of the husband’s accounts receivable from loans he made to his businesses; and (2) the trial court’s failure to make factual findings before denying her request for bridge-the-gap alimony.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth DCA”) agreed with our position that the trial court had erred in failing to award our client half of the husband’s accounts receivable. The Fourth DCA reversed and remanded. On remand to the trial court, the former husband took the position that the issue required an evidentiary hearing to determine the new equitable distribution of the asset. We opposed the need for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that the Fourth DCA had clearly stated in its written opinion that the value of the omitted account receivable was $660,611 based on undisputed testimony from the trial. The trial court agreed and entered an order denying the former husband’s demand for an evidentiary hearing.

The former husband next argued that the former wife should receive the omitted equitable distribution amount as an in-kind distribution (i.e. in assets of the business such as the notes themselves). We opposed the former husband’s position and argued that the former wife should receive the omitted amount as a cash distribution. The trial court received proposed Final Judgments from the parties reflecting the parties’ positions. On June 7, 2012 the trial court rendered an Amended Final Judgment that conformed to the appellate court’s mandate and also ordered that the omitted amount would be payable to former wife in cash in an amended equalization payment.

This outcome preserved the positive result we achieved in the appellate court for our client, saved her the additional attorney’s fees associated with a lengthy evidentiary hearing following remand, and obtained an order that the former husband must pay her the omitted equitable distribution amount in cash.

Arafat v. U-Haul Center Margate, 4D10-1179
June 22, 2011

The Fourth District addressed a writ of certiorari challenging a circuit court’s dismissal of an appeal as untimely. Arafat filed a complaint in small claims county court for $5,000 based on a statement of claim for items that were removed from her storage unit. The court entered judgment for the defendants on May 21, 2009. Arafat filed a motion for rehearing on June 1, 2009 but did not actually serve it until June 3, 2009.  The trial court denied the motion but ruled the denial would not take effect until September 1, 2009.  On September 24, 2009 Arafat filed a notice of appeal.  The defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Arafat’s motion for rehearing was untimely and that because the judgment came from a nonjury trial, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 mandates that a motion for rehearing be filed within ten days of the final judgment.  The circuit court agreed and dismissed the appeal.
On appeal, the Fourth District noted that Florida Small Claims Rule 7.180 provides that a motion for new trial must be filed within ten days. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 provides that a motion for new trial or rehearing must be served within ten days. Because this case originated in small claims, and because the Florida Small Claims Rules do not incorporate Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, the Fourth District held that the motion for rehearing was timely. Florida Small Claims Rule 7.230 provides that appeals from small claims court shall be governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), an authorized and timely motion for new trial or rehearing tolls rendition of the order of the trial court until disposition of the motion. The Fourth District quashed the dismissal of the appeal and remanded the case to be decided on the merits.

Barrueta v. State of Florida, 4D10-2084
June 15, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeals addressed an appeal from a revocation of probation and resulting judgment and sentence. The appellant was on probation following a conviction on one count of trafficking in cocaine and one count of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. The State later obtained revocation of appellant’s probation and the trial court sentenced appellant on both of those counts. On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant on the conspiracy count because the State’s warrant failed to allege a violation as to that count. The Fourth District agreed, relying on Baker v. State, 750 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). As a result, the Fourth District reversed the revocation, judgment, and sentence as to the conspiracy count, although it affirmed on the trafficking count. The Fourth District also remanded for entry of a more specific and detailed written judgment.

Chrysler Group, LLC v. Musacchia, 4D10-212
June 8, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeal recently reversed a trial court decision granting a claim for attorney’s fees under section 681.112(1), Florida Statutes (2006).  The Musacchias filed a successful arbitration action against Chrysler with the Lemon Law New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board after they experienced numerous problems with a Jeep Commander they had leased. The board determined that the vehicle was in fact a “lemon” and that the Musacchias were entitled to a refund. The Musacchias later filed suit under section 681.112(1) seeking their attorney’s fees from the arbitration as “damages” resulting from their purchase of the vehicle.  The trial court awarded the Musacchias their attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the Fourth District, citing its recent decision in General Motors v. Bowie, 58 So. 3d 934, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), held that “‘damages’ under section 681.112 do not include attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing the refund option through arbitration.” Consequently, the Fourth District reversed the decision of the trial court with directions to enter judgment for Chrysler.

Caproc Third Ave., L.L.C. v. Donisi Ins. Inc., and Donosi, 4D09-4792
June 1, 2011

The Fourth District wrote to address the issue of who may properly deny facts set forth in a judgment debtor’s affidavit for exemption under section 222.12, Florida Statutes.  Caproc Third Avenue, LLC (“Caproc”) obtained a final judgment against Charles Donisi. A writ of garnishment was issued against Donisi’s personal bank accounts. Donisi filed an Emergency Motion to Dissolve the Writ and executed an affidavit asserting his accounts were exempt from garnishment. In response, Caproc’s attorney filed an “attorney’s affidavit” that denied under oath the facts set forth in Donisi’s affidavit.  The trial court dissolved the writ and found the affidavit filed by Caproc’s attorney legally insufficient to satisfy Caproc’s burden under §222.12 to deny the facts under oath.

Caproc appealed, arguing that it was permissible under the statute for its attorney to execute the sworn denial of the debtor’s exemption affidavit. The Fourth District disagreed, holding that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous in its requirement that the party who sued out the process, and not the party’s attorney, deny under oath the facts set forth by the debtor.  The Court stated S. Attractions, Inc. v. Grau for the proposition that “[u]nder a statute requiring an affidavit to be made by a particular person himself, his agent or attorney cannot make it.” 93 So.2d 120, 125 (Fla. 1967).  The Fourth District affirmed the dissolution of the writ.

Shelby Homes at Millstone, Inc. v. Cullinane, 4D10-289
May 18, 2011

Four months prior to expiration of the contractual time period for completion of a home, the buyers’ counsel sent a letter to the seller’s counsel stating that the home buyers “may not be able to obtain financing under the same terms and conditions as originally intended” and that certain allegedly fraudulent representations by the seller “may render closing impossible.” The buyers also requested various documents from the seller. The seller replied, in a letter from its counsel, that the seller would provide the requested documents once a closing date was scheduled and the buyers had confirmed they were in fact closing. The seller informed the buyers that if the buyers failed to close, the seller would consider them in default and keep their deposits. The buyers never replied. The seller completed the home (after expiration of the contractual time period), sold the home to a different buyer, and kept the original buyers’ deposits.

The buyers sued for breach of contract, seeking return of their deposits, based on the seller’s failure to complete construction of the home in the time required by the contract. The seller raised the defense of anticipatory repudiation based on the buyers’ letter and contract language allowing the seller to treat any written communication informing the seller that the buyers “may be unable or unwilling to close” as an anticipatory breach. The trial court found that the buyers’ letter did not amount to an anticipatory breach and that the seller’s letter in response did not require a response from the buyers confirming that they would close.

On appeal, the Fourth DCA held that the buyers’ letter fell within the contract’s provision allowing the seller to treat it as an indication of inability or unwillingness to close and therefore an anticipatory breach. Despite this holding, the Fourth DCA affirmed based upon the seller’s failure to treat the anticipatory breach according to the applicable procedures contained in the contract. The Fourth DCA stated that this failure to follow its own contract’s remedies led the seller to ultimately breach the contract by failing to timely complete the home. The Fourth DCA held that the trial court had reached the right result for the wrong reasons. In that situation, the Court can still affirm the result. This is sometimes called the “tipsy coachman” rule. See Dade Cty Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644-45 (Fla. 1999).

The issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering our client and our client’s attorney to pay 57.105 attorney’s fees in a defamation action.

Our client sued the opposing party for defamation after being forced out of business by the opposing party’s outrageous allegation that our client, a jeweler, replaced diamonds from the opposing party’s ring with cubic zirconias. Even though our client vehemently denied the accusation, the opposing party filed a police report accusing our client of replacing the diamonds with artificial stones. Several days later, however, the opposing party contacted the police to notify them that the diamonds in the ring were not swapped but were the original diamonds. Nevertheless, the opposing party moved for summary judgment and 57.105 attorney’s fees, against our client and our client’s attorney, stating that the accusation was believed to be true and our client failed to show malice. The trial court granted the summary judgment and the 57.105 fees reasoning that the opposing party was entitled to a qualified privilege for reporting a crime to the police.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s 57.105 award and hinted that summary judgment was inappropriate. Specifically, the court noted that when a trial court grants an award of 57.105 attorney’s fees, “the reviewing court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding no justifiable issues of law or fact.”  In other words, the court held that “[a] case is frivolous” justifying the award of fees, “when it can be said to be ‘completely without merit in law’ or ‘contradicted by overwhelming evidence.’” As applied to our client, the court found that express malice may be inferred from the opposing party’s unreasonable conduct in accusing our client of stealing the diamonds and then, without ever investigating the matter, filing a police report. The court noted that, at the time the opposing party filed the report accusing our client of theft, the opposing party made no attempt to find out if the accusation was true. The court concluded that there was a reasonable inference that the opposing party intended to harm our client by getting the police involved, “perhaps because of their heated exchange the day before.”

Editor’s Note: At the time of writing this blog entry, a mandate from the court had not been issued.