Jonathan Mann of Law Offices of Robin Bresky Obtains Reversal in Fifth District Court of Appeal of Final Judgment Modifying Timesharing Entered After Judge Disqualified Himself

Parnell v. Parnell, 5D12-785

Jonathan Mann of the Law Offices of Robin Bresky recently obtained reversal, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal, of a final judgment of modification of timesharing of a minor child. The parties’ son was two years old in 2008 at the time of the parties’ divorce. Two years after the divorce, the father sought to modify the timesharing schedule regarding the son. The trial court held a hearing on the father’s petition and at the end of the hearing made an oral ruling granting the modification.

However, the trial judge later disqualified himself from the case, and all cases involving the mother’s trial attorneys, shortly after the hearing due to a motion by the mother’s trial attorneys alleging fears they would not receive fair treatment. The parties then disagreed over the details of the final written judgment granting modification. The mother objected to the father’s proposed final judgment. The trial court rendered a written final judgment two months later granting the father’s petition for modification, despite the judge having disqualified himself.

On appeal to the Fifth DCA, Mann argued on behalf of the mother that the trial court’s final judgment was void because the trial judge rendered the written final judgment after disqualifying himself. Mann acknowledged the existence of the “ministerial act” exception that allows a disqualified trial judge to reduce a prior oral ruling to writing. However, the exception does not apply where the judge exercises any further discretion prior to rendering the written order. Mann argued that the exception was inapplicable in this case because the trial court had used further discretion regarding the parties’ disagreement over the proposed final judgment before rendering the written final judgment.

The Fifth DCA agreed that the ministerial act exception to the disqualification rule did not apply in this case. The Fifth DCA issued a written per curiam opinion reversing the final judgment of modification. This beneficial result in the appellate court undid the final judgment that was detrimental to our client.

The Law Offices of Robin Bresky recently won a motion for rehearing of an order of contempt that held our client in contempt for failure to pay an award of temporary attorney’s fees. We are in the process of appealing the underlying order requiring our client to pay fees to opposing counsel. The parties were divorced in 2005 and the final judgment of dissolution incorporated a marital settlement agreement that detailed the former husband’s alimony obligation. In 2011, the former wife filed a petition for modification of alimony seeking an increase in her alimony based on her allegations that the parties’ financial circumstances had changed substantially. As part of her petition, the former wife requested an award of temporary attorney’s fees. The trial court conducted a hearing and awarded the former wife $79,333 in attorney’s fees for the modification litigation.

Our client, the former husband, was unable to pay the temporary fee award due to a downturn in his business attributable to poor economic conditions. The former wife later filed a motion for contempt against our client based on his failure to pay. The trial court conducted a contempt hearing and then granted the former wife’s motion to hold our client in contempt.

Our firm filed a motion for rehearing of the order granting the former wife’s motion for contempt. We stressed that civil contempt requires a court finding of both a party’s willful non-compliance and that a party has the present ability to comply with the court’s order. We argued that the trial court had failed to adequately identify the means by which our client could satisfy the purge amount, and also that the order of contempt was improperly based in part upon a prospective ability to pay because it assumed our client would be able to make future regular payments to the former wife’s attorney. We argued that this framework ran contrary to the legal principle that contempt must be based upon a present ability to pay. We also argued that the trial court had failed to make findings that our client had equity in certain assets that the trial court had identified.

The trial court held a hearing and agreed with our position. The trial court rendered an order granting the motion for rehearing of the order granting the former wife’s motion for contempt. This positive outcome undid the order of contempt and prevented our client from being put in jail for not paying an attorney’s fee award that he could not afford to pay.

Parris v. Silveira and Parris
Case No. 4D11-3006

Angelica Parris gave birth to a child while married to Joseph Parris. Angelica later filed for divorce, representing in her petition for dissolution that there were no minor children of the marriage. The trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Silveira later filed a paternity action pertaining to the child Angelica had given birth to while still married to Joseph Parris. The trial court dismissed the paternity action based upon the presumption of Joseph Parris’ paternity during the marriage. The trial court later discovered Angelica’s representation in the dissolution of marriage action that there were no children of her marriage to Joseph Parris. The trial court vacated its previous order dismissing the paternity action. The court held a contempt hearing and found Angelica in contempt for her false representations in both cases. The court ordered that Angelica could purge the contempt by arranging for a DNA test to determine the child’s paternity.

In a written opinion, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) held that the trial court erred in finding Angelica in civil contempt. The Fourth DCA stressed that civil contempt is a coercive sanction that is used to compel compliance with a court order. Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1985). Although Angelica may have previously lied, she could not properly be held in civil contempt because she was under no court order to perform any act. The Fourth DCA reversed.