Valencia v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 4D09-3297
June 22, 2011

The Fourth District addressed an appeal of an order granting summary final judgment in favor if the lender in a foreclosure proceeding.  The complaint had alleged December 1, 2003 as the date of the borrower’s default. The mortgage required that the lenders provide the borrowers written notification of the default that included the action necessary to cure the default, and gave the borrowers thirty days to comply. The lenders were unable to produce a hard copy of the letter that was actually sent to the borrowers. Instead, the lenders produced two possible letters that could have been sent to the borrower. Both letters contained a cure date of October 8, 2003. The actual letter was found by the borrowers after the summary judgment hearing. It contained a different cure date and a different amount owed than the complaint and the two hard copies produced by the lender.  The Fourth District held that there was a genuine issue of material fact because of these differences, and reversed the order of summary judgment.

Cissel v. Cissel, 4D09-3029 & 4D10-1324
June 22, 2011

The Fourth District wrote to address an appeal of an alimony award and child support.  The court below found the former husband, appellant, to have a gross monthly income of $18,109.  The figure was based on his average earnings during the preceding fourteen months of trial.  The appellant argued that this error.  The Fourth District held that although it was acceptable to use this average, it was error to base any support from this figure in this case.  Citing §61.08(2)(i), Fla. Stat. (requiring consideration of all sources of income available to either party), the Fourth District found the trial court to have failed to deduct the husband’s undisputed business expenses.
The Fourth District also found error in the trial court’s award of alimony to former wife.  The trial court had only made findings as to the length of the marriage and the $20,000 per month standard of living that exceeded the parties’ incomes.  On appeal, the Fourth District again referred to §61.08(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring findings of facts relative to the factors enumerated in subsection (2) supporting an award of alimony).  Additionally, the court noted that the marital standard of living is not a useful guide in awarding alimony where the marital lifestyle costs more than the parties’ earnings.  Nichols v. Nichols, 907 So.2d 620, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  The Fourth District reversed and remanded.

Barrueta v. State of Florida, 4D10-2084
June 15, 2011

The Fourth District Court of Appeals addressed an appeal from a revocation of probation and resulting judgment and sentence. The appellant was on probation following a conviction on one count of trafficking in cocaine and one count of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. The State later obtained revocation of appellant’s probation and the trial court sentenced appellant on both of those counts. On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant on the conspiracy count because the State’s warrant failed to allege a violation as to that count. The Fourth District agreed, relying on Baker v. State, 750 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). As a result, the Fourth District reversed the revocation, judgment, and sentence as to the conspiracy count, although it affirmed on the trafficking count. The Fourth District also remanded for entry of a more specific and detailed written judgment.

Dedmon and Kelly v. Kelly, 4D09-3572
May 18, 2011

The Fourth District wrote to address an appeal from an order of dismissal of appellants’ complaint for failure to appear at a case management conference. A clerk’s default was entered in favor of appellants, and the appellee’s motion to set aside default was denied by the magistrate on September 3, 2008. On July 1, 2009 appellants’ new counsel filed their Motion for Approval of Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel and sent copies to appellee’s counsel and to appellants’ former counsel at an address different from the one used by former counsel in earlier pleadings.  The trial court set a case management conference was set for July 30, 2009, which stated that there had been no record activity since September 3, 2008.  The order was sent to appellants’ former counsel. Appellants’ new counsel failed to show up, and the trial court dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.200(c), which allows a court to dismiss for failure to attend a case management conference, and upon Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e), which provides for dismissal for failure to prosecute an action.

On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with appellants that, under First Fairway Condominium I Ass’n v. Gulfstream Roofing, Inc., 701 So.2d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the trial court erred in imposing the harsh sanction of dismissal without finding that the party’s conduct was “willful and contumacious.”  The trial court’s order failed to include an express finding of willful and contumacious behavior. Without considering the lack of notice requirement to the appellants, the court also held that appellants’ alleged inaction for a period of time less than one year was insufficient cause for dismissal under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e). The court reversed and remanded.