Preudhomme v. Bailey
Case No. 4D10-3262

Our firm challenged the trial court’s final judgment on behalf of a former wife claiming that the lower court erred in dividing the assets, calculating income of the husband, awarding an inadequate amount of alimony, calculating child support payable by the wife, and including overly restrictive parenting provisions. The case involved a highly contentious divorce of a sixteen year marriage involving three minor children. Although the former wife had a CPA license, she stayed at home with the minor children. The former husband traded and managed properties.

In the final judgment, the lower court commented that much of the evidence was conflicting and the facts were disputed. The court then divided the various assets and awarded sole parental responsibility with the father. In addition, the court significantly prohibited the former wife from petitioning for modification of the parenting plan unless she completed: (1) fifty-two weeks of individual psychological therapy; (2) another twenty-six weeks of joint psychological therapy with the children; (3) five additional sessions on child discipline; and (4) two eight-week sessions in parental effectiveness training.

On Appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Appellate Court determined that the lower court erred in calculating stock due to the wife based upon the lower court’s failure to make factual findings as to whether the initial stock was purchased or a gift. Furthermore, the lower court’s findings regarding numerous bonus shares of stock were not supported by competent substantial evidence.

The Court also found that the lower court erred by refusing to determine whether real property owned by the former husband in Jamaica was marital or non-marital property. Specifically, section 61.075(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, requires the court to make clear identification of marital and non-marital assets. Therefore, the lower court could not refuse to address the property in Jamaica, as it did here.

Finally, the Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in parts of the parenting plan as there was no competent substantial evidence to support the specific type and length of therapy ordered by the court for the former wife. Furthermore, there was no evidence to support the specific time restrictions on the former wife’s ability to petition for modification of the parenting plan which severely impacted her ability to parent her children. Thus, the lower court could not arbitrarily determine that the therapy must last a specific time before the former wife could request to spend more time with her children.

S.L. v. Department of Children & Families
Case No. 4D11-3844

The trial court rendered an order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her minor child, S.A. S.A., whose father was serving a long sentence of incarceration, was residing with his half-siblings (the mother’s other children) and their father. The Department had sought to terminate both of S.A.’s parents’ rights to him in order to give S.A. permanency. However, the Department had not moved to terminate the mother’s rights to her children that were living with their father. The mother, S.L., appealed, arguing that the trial court’s finding that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting S.A. was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Specifically, the mother argued that termination was not the least restrictive means where the trial court did not also terminate her parental rights to her other children. In support, the mother relied upon In re G.R., 793 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

In a written opinion, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) distinguished S.L.’s factual circumstances from those present in In re G.R. The Fourth DCA noted that the facts of S.L.’s case were completely different. Unlike the mother in In re G.R., S.L. had made no progress on her case plan, had not seen S.A. more than a year, and resided out of state. The Fourth DCA therefore affirmed, concluding that the trial court had correctly applied the least restrictive means test as to S.A. individually.