Florida Dep’t of Revenue v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 4D10-456
June 22, 2011

The issue of the taxability of gasoline sales to the Seminole Tribe made off the reservation was presented to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.  The trial court granted the Seminole Tribe’s motion for summary judgment while denying the Department of Revenue’s (“DOR”) motion for summary judgment.  The trial court held that the Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution prohibited the State of Florida from taxing any fuel consumed by the tribe on the reservation.
The Fourth DCA performed a de novo review of the matter and held that the Seminole Tribe was not entitled to a refund for taxes on gasoline purchased off the reservation, regardless of where or how it was used. The Court relied on Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), where the Supreme Court upheld a motor-fuel tax imposed on non-Indian distributers who purchased the fuel off the reservation but ultimately delivered it to gas stations owned by the tribe and located on tribal lands.  In contrast, this case dealt with the purchase of gasoline outside of tribal lands by members of the Seminole Tribe. The Fourth DCA noted that it would be impossible to track the usage of the fuel.  Also, the Court acknowledged that because the tribe reaps the benefit of untaxed gasoline purchased on the reservation regardless of where it is used, common sense would suggest that fuel purchased off the reservation should be subject to the fuel tax, regardless of where it is used.  As a result, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Seminole Tribe and held that “off-reservation transactions, even by tribal members, are susceptible of taxation without running afoul of the Indian Commerce Clause.”

Carlin v. Javorek

The issue was whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s reversal of a trial court’s order denying an award of attorney’s fees to our client.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal recently reversed a trial court decision holding that our client was not entitled to attorney’s fees despite finding that the opposing party was in breach of the parties’ settlement agreement. The trial court found that the opposing party breached the settlement agreement by failing to produce the required medical forms and failing to execute a medical release. However, the trial court held that the breach was not material and denied both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the issue de novo and held that the trial court did not err in denying the opposing party’s request for attorney’s fees, but erred in finding that the opposing party’s breach was immaterial and in denying our client’s request for reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement. The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the opposing party materially breached the settlement agreement and that the settlement agreement’s clear and unambiguous terms mandated an award of attorney’s fees to our client as the prevailing party. The opposing party petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review claiming that the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision expressly and directly conflicted with other district court and Supreme Court decisions. Our law firm continued representation of our client in the Supreme Court. Jurisdictional briefs were filed by both parties.

In agreement with the arguments in our jurisdictional brief, the Supreme Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, denied opposing party’s petition for review, and awarded additional attorney’s fees to our client.