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Fourth DCA Case 4D13-368
The Law Offices of Robin Bresky recently prevailed in an original proceeding, a petition for writ of prohibition, to prevent the trial judge from presiding over further proceedings in a guardianship case where our client is the spouse and designated healthcare surrogate of the ward.
The American judicial system is built upon the principle of an impartial court where every litigant will be heard and treated fairly. A trial judge can be disqualified from further activity in a case if bias or prejudice is shown to a party and places that party in reasonable fear of not getting a fair trial or hearing. That is what happened at a hearing where the court made a critical decision about the guardianship of our client’s husband.
On review by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the appellate court concluded that the judge’s acts of excluding the spouse from the courtroom, striking (refusing to consider) her testimony on the basis of a perceived insult to the judge, and making negative personal comments about the spouse, would lead any reasonably-prudent person to fear that she would not receive a fair hearing before the judge.
The appellate court also concluded that the judge’s actions and personal comments “far exceeded comments or actions necessary to control his courtroom and were sufficient to evidence to a reasonable person bias requiring disqualification, even if the judge may have felt that he had no bias.” Thus, the Fourth DCA granted the petition for disqualification and the case was assigned to a different judge.
The Law Offices of Robin Bresky continually fights for justice for our clients. We handle a wide variety of appeals and original petitions in state and federal appellate courts and are available to assist other lawyers with litigation support such as drafting or responding to motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions for rehearing, and other substantive motions in the trial court.
Atlantis Estate Acquisitions, Inc. v. DePierro, 4D11-295
April 24, 2013
Jonathan Mann of Law Offices of Robin Bresky Obtains Reversal in Fifth District Court of Appeal of Final Judgment Modifying Timesharing Entered After Judge Disqualified Himself Parnell v. Parnell, 5D12-785 Jonathan Mann of the Law Offices of Robin Bresky recently obtained reversal, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal, of a final judgment of modification of timesharing of a minor child. The parties’ son was two years old in 2008 at the time of the parties’ divorce. Two years after the divorce, the father sought to modify the timesharing schedule regarding the son. The trial court held a hearing on the father’s petition and at the end of the hearing made an oral ruling granting the modification. However, the trial judge later disqualified himself from the case, and all cases involving the mother’s trial attorneys, shortly after the hearing due to a motion by the mother’s trial attorneys alleging fears they would not receive fair treatment. The parties then disagreed over the details of the final written judgment granting modification. The mother objected to the father’s proposed final judgment. The trial court rendered a written final judgment two months later granting the father’s petition for modification, despite the judge having disqualified himself. On appeal to the Fifth DCA, Mann argued on behalf of the mother that the trial court’s final judgment was void because the trial judge rendered the written final judgment after disqualifying himself. Mann acknowledged the existence of the “ministerial act” exception that allows a disqualified trial judge to reduce a prior oral ruling to writing. However, the exception does not apply where the judge exercises any further discretion prior to rendering the written order. Mann argued that the exception was inapplicable in this case because the trial court had used further discretion regarding the parties’ disagreement over the proposed final judgment before rendering the written final judgment. The Fifth DCA agreed that the ministerial act exception to the disqualification rule did not apply in this case. The Fifth DCA issued a written per curiam opinion reversing the final judgment of modification. This beneficial result in the appellate court undid the final judgment that was detrimental to our client.
Christina Parnell v. Brett Allen Parnell, 5D12-785
April 12, 2013
Jonathan Mann of the Law Offices of Robin Bresky recently obtained reversal in the Fifth District Court of Appeal of a final judgment of modification of timesharing of a minor child. The parties’ son was two years old in 2008 at the time of the parties’ divorce. Two years after the divorce, the father sought to modify the timesharing schedule regarding the son. The trial court held a hearing on the father’s petition and at the end of the hearing made an oral ruling granting the modification.
However, the trial judge later disqualified himself from the case, and all cases involving the mother’s trial attorneys, shortly after the hearing due to a motion by the mother’s trial attorneys alleging fears they would not receive fair treatment. The parties then disagreed over the details of the final written judgment granting modification. The mother objected to the father’s proposed final judgment. The trial court rendered a written final judgment two months later granting the father’s petition for modification, despite the judge having disqualified himself.
On appeal to the Fifth DCA, Mann argued on behalf of the mother that the trial court’s final judgment was void because the trial judge rendered the written final judgment after disqualifying himself. Mann acknowledged the existence of the “ministerial act” exception that allows a disqualified trial judge to reduce a prior oral ruling to writing. However, the exception does not apply where the judge exercises any further discretion prior to rendering the written order. Mann argued that the exception was inapplicable in this case because the trial court had used further discretion regarding the parties’ disagreement over the proposed final judgment before rendering the written final judgment.
The Fifth DCA agreed that the ministerial act exception to the disqualification rule did not apply in this case. The Fifth DCA issued a written per curiam opinion reversing the final judgment of modification. This beneficial result in the appellate court undid the final judgment that was detrimental to our client.
** At this time, the time for a motion for rehearing has not expired and the court’s mandate has not yet issued **
Monday, January 23rd, 2012
Rice v. Rice
Case No. 4D10-2523
We represented a former wife whose trial counsel succeeded in getting her former husband’s petition for modification of alimony dismissed, as well as attorney’s fees as a sanction. The parties had divorced in 2005 and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement whereby the former husband paid the former wife alimony. In 2009, the former husband filed a Petition for Downward Modification of Alimony. The former husband originally alleged three separate grounds as changed circumstances for his petition, but later withdrew two of them and proceeded only upon his contention that the former Wife’s receipt of social security payments constituted a sufficient change in circumstances. However, the former husband was aware that former wife’s overall financial condition had declined, even with the receipt of social security, due to a decrease in her income from her business and investments. The trial court agreed with our client’s trial counsel that the former husband failed to make a sufficient prima facie (initial) showing of a basis for modification.
The former husband appealed, arguing that he had made a prima facie case for modification, and that the trial court’s finding that the former husband’s claims were “frivolous and non-meritorious” was also in error. We responded that the trial court had not in fact granted an involuntary dismissal and that the result should be affirmed regardless. The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a per curiam affirmance of the trial court decision. This ruling by the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Petition for Downward Modification, thereby maintaining the beneficial result for our client.
Monday, October 17th, 2011
Rahabi v. FIGA
Case No. 4D10-846*
The issue on appeal was whether our clients were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees because FIGA affirmatively denied our clients’ claim under the insurance policy prior to paying the appraisal award.
Our clients’ roof was damaged by Hurricane Wilma in 2005. Our clients sought coverage under the insurance policy to repair their roof. FIGA took over our clients’ insurance policy with Atlantic Preferred. In 2007, our clients filed a complaint and, initially, FIGA moved for dismissal. Later, FIGA filed an answer with affirmative defenses, and, after several months of discovery, FIGA decided to send the dispute for appraisal. An appraisal award was issued to our clients and FIGA paid the appraisal award. Our clients requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs from the trial court. The trial court denied the request reasoning that FIGA never affirmatively denied coverage of our clients’ claim. Our clients appealed arguing that FIGA affirmatively denied their claim by its actions.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed. The court held that FIGA affirmatively denied our clients’ claim by asserting, in several of its affirmative defenses that our clients’ damages “were not caused by a covered loss.” The court disagreed with FIGA’s argument that its actions amounted to no more than a delay in payment of the claim. The court distinguished our clients’ decision from its recent decision in Ehrlich in which it held that FIGA did not affirmatively deny the party’s claim by filing its affirmative defenses because it was forced to file the pleading by a court order and sought an extension of time to complete its investigation. The court held that, in our clients’ case, FIGA neither sought an extension to complete its investigation nor had a court order compelling it to file a responsive pleading. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court set an evidentiary hearing to determine our clients’ reasonable sum of fees and to determine whether our clients were entitled to a reimbursement of their costs.
*The Mandate has yet to be issued.
Wednesday, October 5th, 2011
Shinitzky v. Shinitzky
Case No. 4D10-137
We represented a former husband whose marriage was dissolved by a final judgment in 2007. The final judgment ordered the former wife to pay our client half “of the value” of certain investment accounts held by the parties. The former wife appealed. The trial court denied the former wife’s motion for stay pending appeal and granted our client’s motion to enforce the final judgment to distribute the funds. The former wife obtained a temporary stay in the appellate court that was eventually extended until the appeal became final, but that did not require the former wife to post a bond. The Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth DCA”) affirmed the final judgment in its totality prior to our involvement in the case. Our client again brought a motion to enforce. A successor judge granted our client’s motion but ruled that he was entitled to a division of the accounts in kind, rather than half of the value of the accounts as of the date previously specified in the final judgment. This interpretation of the final judgment by the trial court was significant because the accounts had significantly decreased in value.
On appeal, the Fourth DCA agreed with our argument that the trial court had misinterpreted the final judgment. The Fourth DCA noted that it was improper for the successor trial judge to have taken new evidence at the hearing, including expert testimony, that eventually led to the successor judge significantly altering the final judgment and enforcement order.
The Fourth DCA reversed and remanded for the effectuation of the final order, including (1) payment to our client of one half of the value of the investment accounts as of the date specified in the final judgment, and (2) payment of a $193,479.50 equalizing payment by the former wife to our client with interest from its original 2007 due date.
Tuesday, September 27th, 2011
VOIS, Inc. v. Michael Spindel and Edward Spindel
Case No. 10-15668-D
We represented a corporation that had gone through multiple changes of ownership since issuing promissory notes to two of its investors and former directors, the Spindels. The corporation sued the Spindels for corporate wrongdoing, and the Spindels countersued claiming they were never paid under the promissory notes relating to their investments. The Spindels removed the case to federal court. During the litigation, the corporation discovered that it possessed the original promissory notes, giving rise to the legal presumption that the debts had been satisfied. However, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Spindels, despite evidence showing that the corporation properly mailed the original promissory notes to the Spindels, supporting the corporation’s position that its debt under the notes had been satisfied.
On appeal, we argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Spindels where evidence existed from which a finder of fact could conclude the corporation mailed the spindles the original promissory notes. Summary judgment is inappropriate where there exists conflicting evidence as to an issue of material fact. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed. The court reasoned that the trial court’s finding the evidence was undisputed was erroneous because the corporation had produced evidence indicating that it sent the Spindels the original notes. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Tuesday, September 27th, 2011
Bell v. Bell
This was a divorce case involving several issues regarding the parties’ marital and non-marital assets. Our client appealed and the opposing party cross appealed. Our client’s main issues were the trial court’s failure to (1) award her half of the husband’s accounts receivable from loans he made to his businesses; and (2) make factual findings before denying her request for bridge-the-gap alimony.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court erred in failing to award our client half of the husband’s accounts receivable. It reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court make specific written findings regarding the assets. Likewise, Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court reversibly erred in failing to make the appropriate findings regarding our client’s request for bridge-the-gap-alimony, and it also reversed on that point. Our client was awarded entitlement to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. Shortly thereafter, the opposing party filed a motion for rehearing and/or clarification to which our client responded. In agreement with our response, the Fourth District Court of Appeal denied the opposing party’s request for rehearing and/or clarification.
Wednesday, June 22nd, 2011
Carlin v. Javorek
The issue was whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s reversal of a trial court’s order denying an award of attorney’s fees to our client.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal recently reversed a trial court decision holding that our client was not entitled to attorney’s fees despite finding that the opposing party was in breach of the parties’ settlement agreement. The trial court found that the opposing party breached the settlement agreement by failing to produce the required medical forms and failing to execute a medical release. However, the trial court held that the breach was not material and denied both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the issue de novo and held that the trial court did not err in denying the opposing party’s request for attorney’s fees, but erred in finding that the opposing party’s breach was immaterial and in denying our client’s request for reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement. The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the opposing party materially breached the settlement agreement and that the settlement agreement’s clear and unambiguous terms mandated an award of attorney’s fees to our client as the prevailing party. The opposing party petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review claiming that the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision expressly and directly conflicted with other district court and Supreme Court decisions. Our law firm continued representation of our client in the Supreme Court. Jurisdictional briefs were filed by both parties.
In agreement with the arguments in our jurisdictional brief, the Supreme Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, denied opposing party’s petition for review, and awarded additional attorney’s fees to our client.
To view citation and full opinion of Carlin v.Jevorek, click here.
Thursday, April 14th, 2011
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(b) states:
A motion for attorneys’ fees may be served not later than the time for service of the reply brief and shall state the grounds on which recovery is sought. The assessment of attorneys’ fees may be remanded to the lower tribunal. If attorney’s fees are assessed by the court, the lower tribunal may enforce payment.
We recently filed a motion for attorneys’ fees in the Fourth District Court of Appeal after the opposing party voluntarily dismissed her own motion for contempt and petition for modification of the final judgment as to child custody in the trial court. We had appealed the trial court’s order denying our client’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Neither the parties nor the child in this family law case had any relationship to the State of Florida.
After we submitted an Initial Brief in the appellate court, the opposing party voluntarily dismissed her motion for contempt and petition for modification in the trial court and asked the appellate court to dismiss the pending appeal. We then filed a successful motion for attorneys’ fees in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Having secured entitlement to fees, we will now be going back to the trial court to obtain the actual award of fees.
If you have any questions regarding this case, or if you have any other appellate or trial support questions, contact The Law Offices of Robin Bresky at 561-994-6273.
Wednesday, November 24th, 2010
The issue was whether a trial court’s order denying exceptions to a general magistrate’s report and affirming the report, with several exceptions, was appealable as a final order or an appealable non-final order.
We represented the Father of an infant child in a contentious custody dispute over timesharing and other issues. A general magistrate entered a report with recommendations regarding a time-sharing schedule, child support, and daycare for the child. The general magistrate also found that the Father had been involuntarily absent from the child’s life due to the Mother’s actions and her failure to facilitate a relationship between the Father and child. The trial court judge affirmed and implemented the magistrate’s report with several exceptions, and the Mother appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
We filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing (1) that the trial court’s order was neither a final order nor an appealable non-final order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii), and (2) that the appeal should be dismissed based on the Mother’s failure to file an Initial Brief within the time frame required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(e). The court of appeals granted our motion, and we succeeded in obtaining dismissal of the Mother’s appeal for our client.
Friday, September 17th, 2010
The issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering our client and our client’s attorney to pay 57.105 attorney’s fees in a defamation action.
Our client sued the opposing party for defamation after being forced out of business by the opposing party’s outrageous allegation that our client, a jeweler, replaced diamonds from the opposing party’s ring with cubic zirconias. Even though our client vehemently denied the accusation, the opposing party filed a police report accusing our client of replacing the diamonds with artificial stones. Several days later, however, the opposing party contacted the police to notify them that the diamonds in the ring were not swapped but were the original diamonds. Nevertheless, the opposing party moved for summary judgment and 57.105 attorney’s fees, against our client and our client’s attorney, stating that the accusation was believed to be true and our client failed to show malice. The trial court granted the summary judgment and the 57.105 fees reasoning that the opposing party was entitled to a qualified privilege for reporting a crime to the police.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s 57.105 award and hinted that summary judgment was inappropriate. Specifically, the court noted that when a trial court grants an award of 57.105 attorney’s fees, “the reviewing court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding no justifiable issues of law or fact.” In other words, the court held that “[a] case is frivolous” justifying the award of fees, “when it can be said to be ‘completely without merit in law’ or ‘contradicted by overwhelming evidence.’” As applied to our client, the court found that express malice may be inferred from the opposing party’s unreasonable conduct in accusing our client of stealing the diamonds and then, without ever investigating the matter, filing a police report. The court noted that, at the time the opposing party filed the report accusing our client of theft, the opposing party made no attempt to find out if the accusation was true. The court concluded that there was a reasonable inference that the opposing party intended to harm our client by getting the police involved, “perhaps because of their heated exchange the day before.”
To view citation and full opinion of Asinmaz v. Semrau, click here.
Editor’s Note: At the time of writing this blog entry, a mandate from the court had not been issued.
Thursday, August 12th, 2010
The issue of whether the trial court erred in denying our client’s motion for attorney’s fees based on a charging lien merely because our client did not call an independent expert witness to testify concerning the reasonableness of the fees has been certified to the Florida Supreme Court.
Our client, an attorney, represented the Former Wife in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Our client and the Former Wife entered into a retainer agreement which provided for an initial non-refundable retainer, an hourly rate for attorney and paralegal time, and a lien for monies due under the agreement. The agreement also required the Former Wife to notify our client, in writing, within thirty days, if there was an objection to the fees charged. The Former Wife paid $48,268 of the total billed, leaving a balance of $57,785.28. The Former Wife did not object in writing to the fees charged. In the dissolution action, our client filed a Notice of Charging Lien, a Corrected Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Adjudicating Charging Lien and for Entry of a Money Judgment, and a Motion to Withdraw. The trial court granted the Motion to Withdraw, held a final hearing of the dissolution, and heard our client’s attorney’s fees motion. Although the trial court received into evidence the retainer agreement, the complete billing history, and the Notice of Charging Lien, the trial court denied our client’s motion citing to the missing testimony from an independent expert witness concerning the reasonableness of the fees.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reluctantly affirmed the trial court’s decision, but certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court as to whether independent expert testimony was necessary. The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that “[t]here is little reason to simply increase litigation costs by requiring another lawyer to testify as an expert. After all, each party usually chooses a lawyer friend . . . [, and] [t]he trial court is ultimately left to decide the reasonableness of the rate charged and time expended, and then to tax the cost of the expert witness against the losing party.”
To view citation and full opinion of Roshkind v. Machiela, click here.
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Tuesday, October 28, 2009
Cohen V. Cooper
Case No: 4DO7-4056
Many of us are taught at a young age to trust the men and women of the cloth; cloth in this case consisting of a white poly-cotton blend lab coat. In most cases, we trust our physicians with our lives and the lives of our loved ones. As patients, we listen and do as directed by our doctors because afterall, they do know best. In the context of medical malpractice, however, this doctor/patient relationship can become tenuous when the patient feels the doctor’s care has dropped below the acceptable standard and resulted in injury. Trusting patients who feel they have been injured at the hands of a physician quickly turn into inquisitive clients in search of justice. Our firm recently received a favorable Opinion from the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the context of a medical malpractice action. Specifically, the decision hinged on the statute of limitations in the medical malpractice arena and when the time for said cause of action begins to accrue.
Florida Statue 95.11(4)(b) governs the limitations period for a medical malpractice action. The section states that an action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence . . . .” In Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court articulated the standard to be applied as follows: “the knowledge of the injury as referred to in the rule as triggering the statute of limitations means not only knowledge of the injury but also that there is a reasonable possibility that the injury was cause by medical malpractice.” Certainly there are injuries that clearly are caused by medical malpractice. For example, going into surgery to have a cyst removed from your hand and waking to find yourare missing your left leg. But what happens when you experience a less conspicuous injury and although your body is telling you one thing, the physician whose continuing care you are under is reassuring you that all is well and that in time, things will be better? This is the precise issue involved in our case. Essentially there was a factual dispute as to when the patient knew or should have been aware that her injuries may have been the result of medical malpractice. And, instead of submitting that question to the jury for determination, the judge decided at summary judgment that the statute of limitations had run. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the judge’s decision in our favor and found that the judge had erred in taking that question from the jury. The Court, recognizing the inherent trust placed upon a physician by a patient, stated “too great is the faith laypersons place in their physicians for the law to impute a duty on them to investigate malpractice in every change in diagnosis or treatment.” (quoting from Cunningham v. Lowery, 724 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Thus, it appears the courts have tried to impose a balance between patient accountability and the importance of preserving a trusting doctor/patient relationship during and throughout treatment. Most important, however, is that the question will often hinge upon a factual determination and will more often than not be left to the province of the jury to decide.
To view citation and full opinion of Cohen v. Cooper, click here.
Wednesday, July 1st, 2009
Porush v. Porush
Case No: 4D09-949
Many people understand the reality and importance of complying with a court’s order directing that child support payments be made on behalf of their children. What some may not realize is the failure to comply with said obligation could potentially result in a number of sanctions, including garnishment of wages, suspension of a driver’s license, or imprisonment. The law, however, is clear as to the procedure that must be followed prior to the imposition of various sanctions.
We were recently successful in obtaining a stay of proceedings pending appeal, of a civil contempt order suspending our client’s driver’s license based on failure to pay child support arrearages in another state. Under the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, an individual may have his or her driver’s license suspended as a sanction for failing to pay court ordered child support. Pursuant to the rules of appellate procedure, a motion to stay proceedings must first be made in the lower tribunal. If unsuccessful, the motion to stay proceedings can then be made in the appellate court. In this particular case, we explained to the trial court that due to procedural deficiencies with the order on review, we had a good chance of prevailing on appeal. On appeal, we are arguing that the order is subject to reversal where the judge failed to set a purge amount. At the conclusion of the hearing of the Motion to Stay Proceedings, the trial judge, acknowledging the order’s failure to state a purge amount, had the driver’s license suspension recalled pending the outcome of the appeal.
In order to suspend an individual’s driver’s license for failure to pay child support, several findings must be made by the trial court. First, the court must determine that the child support was owed and a failure to pay has occurred. Second, the court must then set a purge amount, meaning that the court must set an amount that the individual must pay in order to avoid or end the sanction of driver license suspension. Finally, the court must make a finding that the individual has the ability to pay the purge amount. In our case, the trial judge found that the client failed to pay court ordered child support, but did not set a purge amount or make a finding that a present ability to pay a purge amount existed. Thus, we were successful in having the suspension recalled pending the appeal. For more, see, e.g., Gregory v. Rice, 727 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1999); Larsen v. Larsen, 901 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
To view citation and full opinion of Porush v. Porush, click here.
December 17, 2008
Siegler v. A. Seigler
Case No: 4D08-2447
Attorney-client privilege is the right of clients to refuse to disclose confidential communications with their lawyers to third parties. This privilege is fundamental to preserve the right to effective legal counsel. Lawyers cannot function effectively on behalf of their clients without the ability to communicate with them in confidence.
With that said, as an appellate attorney, I was successful in overturning a trial court’s decision denying a protective order—preventing the disclosure of attorney client communication. In a case, where a son was suing his mother, we filed a Writ of Certiorari on a discovery issue—a litigation process during which each party requests relevant information and documents from the other side in an attempt to “discover” pertinent facts. The information the son was seeking from the mother, I believed to be attorney-client privilege.
By filing for a Writ of Certiorari, often referred to as a Writ of Cert, I swiftly completed a petition explaining to the appellate court the reasoning that the trial court’s interlocutory order needed to be reversed. After evaluating the petition the appellate court decides whether or not to grant a show cause order to the opposing party. If the court issues a show cause order the opposing party answers the petition. In this particular case the court issued a show cause order and the reply was submitted by the opposing parties’ council.
In less than two months the appellate agreed with our position and the Writ of Cert I filed was granted; and the trial courts decision denying the protective order was overturned. Had we not petitioned the appellate court with the Writ of Cert, the opposing party would have access to privileged information. Thus, I was able to prevent letting the proverbial cat out of the bag.
To view citation and full opinion B. Seigler v. A. Seigler, click here.
If you have questions about the litigation and trial assistance that we provide, contact us anytime by calling 561-994-6273 or via email.
The Law Offices of Robin Bresky is a dedicated appellate law firm handling civil court appeals and providing effective trial and litigation support. The firm serves Boca Raton, Delray Beach, Boynton Beach, West Palm Beach, Coral Springs, Parkland, Margate, Lauderhill, Fort Lauderdale, Deerfield Beach, Broward County and Palm Beach County, and the trial courts and lower tribunals within the jurisdiction of the 4th District Court of Appeals.
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